Introduction
Market discipline plays an important role in banking regulation. According to Lane (1993) , market discipline describes the situation where "financial markets provide signals that lead borrowers to behave in a manner consistent with their solvency." The significance of market discipline is recognized in major policy initiatives and seen as a necessary complement to macroprudential supervision (Nieto, 2012) . Notably, the Basel Committee emphasizes enhancing market discipline through greater disclosure of bank risk information. This is enshrined in Pillar 3 of Basel II, entitled "Market Discipline," which pertains to disclosure requirements (BCBS, 2006) . Scholars have also long argued that market discipline can come from such sources as the bank's own contingent liabilities.
Market discipline of banks is aimed to complement regulators' supervision, that may fail for such reasons as information asymmetry or a weak legal environment. When market discipline works, it is often described as providing banks with incentive to limit their risk-taking by imposing additional costs for pursuing less prudent strategies. The advantage of market discipline for the state is that it is less burdened with the need for regulatory intervention; prudent behavior is enforced partly by bank counterparties and other market participants such as insurers and brokers.
This may explain why a substantial part of the literature on market discipline is devoted to examining the roles of various market stakeholders such as retail and corporate depositors, subordinated debt providers, and bank stockholders. Yet the efficiency of the interbank market, although less explored, plays an important role in bringing stability to the financial system. Thus, it should be worthwhile to consider how effectively a particular interbank market provides market discipline, and if so, identify the disciplining mechanisms.
While most studies in this area focus on establishing the existence of market discipline, it makes sense that once market discipline is identified, they would take the next logical step of attempting to measure the strength or degree of market discipline. Notable efforts at measuring the degree of market discipline in the interbank market include the cross-country analysis of Nier and Baumann (2006) , the examination of Central and Eastern European data by Dinger and von Hagen (2009) , and the study of the Dutch interbank market by Liedorp et al. (2010) . These first two papers find market discipline was effective in reducing bank risk, while the third suggests that the disciplining mechanism failed and
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Market discipline and the Russian interbank market 6 possibly contributed to contagion. Some of this discrepancy no doubt relates to the different risk measures and observation periods used in the analyses. The first two studies are based on data that precede the global financial crisis. The third study includes 2008 and captures the effects of the financial meltdown.
Our aim here is to examine market discipline in the interbank market of Russia.
This large emerging economy provides a rich base for investigation as it had a banking sector with over 1,000 banks operating in the last decade. The main hypothesis tested here is that market discipline in the interbank market is efficient in constraining the risk-taking behavior of banks. For the purposes of our analysis, we use quarterly financial data of the Russian banks for the period 1Q2004-2Q2011. We examine the existence of quantitybased market discipline employing Heckman's sample-selection model and then test the efficiency of market discipline using a panel data model.
Previous studies devoted to market discipline in Russia focus largely on bank deposits. 1 To the best of our knowledge, our earlier study is the only one that considers market discipline in the Russian interbank market (Semenova and Andrievskaya, 2012) . That paper looks at the post-crisis period and deals solely with determining the existence of market discipline. The efficiency of market disciplining mechanisms is not discussed.
In choosing the appropriate market discipline indicators for our estimations, we first consider the standard approach in the literature based on a snapshot of interbank borrowing at the end of a given reporting period. This measure may be misleading in the case of the interbank market, however, as it deals mostly with short-term borrowing and lending. Thus, we employ an alternative indicator, the natural logarithm of interbank borrowing volume.
This study seeks to contribute to the current literature in several ways. First, we cover a relatively long period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) that includes the financial crisis, employing a precise indicator for market discipline. Second, we break new ground by attempting to measure the efficiency of market discipline in the Russian interbank market. As Russian regulators work to implement international standards in banking regulation, they will un-1 Various studies reach distinctly different conclusions. The existence of market discipline (price-and quantity-based) is confirmed in Karas et al. (2006 ) for 1999 -2002 data, Peresetsky et al. (2007 ) for 2002 -2004 data, and Semenova (2007 for 2006 data. Hosono et al. (2004) , in contrast, find no evidence of market discipline in the period 1995 -2002 . Ungan et al. (2008 can only confirm quantity-based market discipline (i.e. no evidence of price-based market discipline) during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] .
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BOFIT Discussion Papers 29/ 2013 7 doubtedly need to pay increased attention to enhancing market discipline. 2 This study contributes to the evolving policy discussion on market discipline in the Russian financial sector, and hopefully these findings provide insight that helps in shaping an appropriate regulatory framework.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the related literature. Section 3 is devoted to the Russian interbank market. We explain our methodology in section 4. Section 5 describes our data and the major findings. Section 6 concludes.
Literature overview
Flannery (2001) discusses market discipline in terms of market monitoring, where investor assessments of the condition of a firm are reflected in its security prices and borrowing rates, and market influence, where the firm reacts (e.g. decreases or increases its risk exposure) to changes in security prices and borrowing rates.
Measuring market influence in the case of banks seems challenging enough that many empirical discussions avoid the issue altogether. 3 Instead, they focus on forms of market monitoring such as tracking of price-based measures to see how lenders raise or lower prices depending on borrower risk; quantity-based measures, where lenders restrict or extend access to credit on the basis of borrower risk; or evidence of maturity shifting, where the length of time the lender is willing to extend a loan is adjusted for borrower risk.
The existence of market discipline has been widely studied in the market of retail and corporate deposits. For example, Hannan and Hanweck (1988) , and Ellis and Flannery (1992) take on price discipline; Jordan (2000) and Goldberg and Hudgins (1996) deal with quantity discipline; and Murata and Hori (2006) and Semenova (2007) examine maturityshifting behavior. Other authors also consider evidence that market discipline is provided by equity prices (e.g. Brewer and Lee, 1986; Distinguin et al., 2006) and debt security prices (e.g. Ashcraft, 2008; Goyal, 2005) .
Market discipline in the interbank market, in contrast, has received comparatively little attention. Theoretical models often assume frictionless competition, where banks act as price-takers (Ho and Saunders, 1985; Clouse and Dow, 2002) . Price discipline is omit-ted altogether. Forced liquidation, a quantity-based measure, is the only disciplining mechanism assumed present in the wholesale funding market (Calomiris, Kahn, 1991; Huang, Ratnovski, 2010) .
Nevertheless, empirical research confirms the existence of both types of market discipline in the interbank market. Price discipline in the US interbank market was first noted by Furfine (2001) . This was subsequently bolstered by the results of King (2008), using more recent US data. The existence of market discipline has also been identified in the Portuguese interbank market (Cocco et al., 2009 ) and the Italian interbank market (Angelini et al., 2009 ).
The existence of market discipline has traditionally been inferred by showing that borrowing rates or amounts lent correspond to bank risk. Ashcraft and Bleakley (2006) point out that this approach may be unreliable when deterioration of borrower creditworthiness increases leverage and leads to higher borrowing costs. Thus, even if there appears to be a positive correlation between borrowing rates and creditworthiness, it does not confirm the existence of market discipline.
To examine the efficiency of market discipline, we draw on Nier and Baumann (2006), who define efficiency as "the degree to which market discipline is effective as an incentive scheme." In other words, efficiency is the extent to which market discipline affects the risk-taking behavior of banks. Rochet and Tirole (1996) point out that increased government intervention tends to lower the efficiency of market discipline. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) demonstrate empirically that market discipline in the deposit market is lower in the presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Several other studies confirm that safety nets erode market discipline (e.g. Billett et al., 1998) . Bliss and Flannery (2002) observe that the type of market significantly affects the power of disciplining mechanisms. For example, if stockholders prefer to hold stocks of riskier firms in exchange for a promise of higher returns, the disciplining mechanism is likely to be fairly weak. Huang and Ratnovski (2010) also find the efficiency of market discipline in the wholesale funding market substantially decreases when there are costless public signals that affect the quality of bank projects such as a credit rating downgrade or upgrade.
There is little research dealing with market discipline efficiency in the interbank To test the hypothesis that market discipline gives banks incentive to limit their risk-taking behavior, Nier and Baumann (2006) ask whether market discipline has any effect on the capital buffers of banks. Analyzing a sample of 729 banks in 32 countries for the period 1993-2000, they find that market discipline is effective in limiting the risktaking behavior of banks, while the moral hazard created by assurances of government bailouts reduces the efficiency of market discipline. Liedorp et al. (2010) consider the Dutch interbank market for the period 1998-2008 and reach a different conclusion. Their main finding is that increased borrowing in the interbank market the increased bank risk. Adding to the evidence that supports the contagion hypothesis, they further identify a spillover effect from credit institutions lending to their sample borrower banks. Contagion is shown to be fairly pronounced in the German interbank market at a time no safety net is present (see Upper and Worms, 2004) .
What emerges from these studies is that regulatory authorities need to be aware of how much they can rely on market discipline to ensure efficient functioning of the interbank market.
Russia's interbank market
It is worthwhile to note some of the features of Russia's relatively small and highly seg- The CBR calculates six interbank interest rates with maturities from one day to one year:
• MIBID (Moscow InterBank Bid Rate),
• MIBOR (Moscow InterBank Offered Rate),
• MIACR (Moscow InterBank Actual Credit Rate),
• MIACR-IG (Moscow InterBank Actual Credit Rate: Investment Grade),
• MIACR-B (Moscow InterBank Actual Credit Rate: B-Grade), and
• RUONIA (Ruble Overnight Index Average).
Interest-rate dynamics reflect the liquidity of the banking system. The MIACR covers the largest number of banks. Looking at Figure Interbank transactions were mainly short-term (Fig. 4 in Appendix I); 91% with a 1-day maturity and 4% having a 1-week maturity. The prevailing currencies ( Fig. 3 in Appendix I) were the US dollar (62%), the Russian ruble (30%), and the euro (8%). The cur-rency breakdown changed as compared to January 2012, when 48% of operations were carried out in RUB, 29% in USD and 23% in EUR. To some extent, this behavior reflects the Russian public's distrust of the banking sector and banks' distrust of each other. Over the course of its existence, Russia's interbank market has experienced several stress events where the lack of trust among banks aggravated an already difficult situation. In particular, the interbank market was hobbled by trust issues in 1995, 1998, 2004, and 2008-2009. While the interbank market trading freezes in 1995 and 1998 were part of larger systemic crises, the stress event in 2004 stemmed directly from a "crisis of trust" in the interbank market that arose after the CBR pulled licenses of several banks, causing negative rumors to swirl (CBR, 2005 (Bogetic, 2008) . To stabilize the financial system, the CBR provided massive liquidity support through a variety of emergency measures such as:
• temporarily reducing the required reserves ratio (4-percentage-point cut in
September 2008),
• extending unsecured loans to banks,
• expanding the capital base of the banking system (RUB 892 billion in subordinated loans were provided to the largest state-owned and private banks),5
• providing government guarantees for loans,
• expanding the list of shares accepted as a collateral for CBR loans,
• lowering requirements for bond ratings that could be included in the CBR Lombard list,
• introducing legislation authorizing the CBR to prevent bank insolvencies, and
• paying compensation for losses on interbank loans (CBR, 2009) . 
Methodology

Determining the existence of market discipline
Before analyzing the effect of market discipline on the risk-taking behavior of banks operating in the interbank market, we need to determine its presence. To determine how borrowing in this market is influenced by information about bank characteristics, including bank risk, we follow a standard approach widely used in the literature. Market sensitivity to bank fundamentals is tested with the following econometric model:
The dependent variable MD i,t is an indicator of market discipline. As noted earlier, we concentrate on quantity-based disciplining mechanisms measured by several indicators. 6 In line with the literature, we use the rate of growth of interbank borrowing. As noted in section 3, just reporting the end-period figure could be misleading as borrowing and lending in the interbank market are generally for the short term. Instead, we use the natural loga- 6 We do not consider the price-based disciplining mechanism here. Establishing its existence requires data on interest rates paid for interbank borrowing. Available information only covers data on the total amount of interbank borrowing of a particular bank i at the end of each month, total interbank volume for each month of bank i, and the quarterly interest payments on interbank loans paid by bank i. There are no details on the maturity of interbank loans. Thus, the average interest rate paid, the usual proxy for analysis of price-based market discipline, cannot be correctly obtained from our data. We separately examine market discipline from non-resident lenders using growth of foreign interbank borrowing as a dependent variable and the natural logarithm of foreign interbank borrowing volume. Non-residents provide a substantial share of interbank loans (see section 3). Non-resident lenders could potentially be more efficient in disciplining
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Russian banks than their domestic counterparties as they are less sensitive to internal rumors and other non-financial information.
Our explanatory variables include bank fundamentals that characterize bank risk- To avoid the endogeneity problem, all variables (except the crisis dummy) are taken with a one-quarter lag. Furthermore, market participants receive information about their counterparties later than the reporting day. Thus, it seems reasonable to consider a one-period lag.
BF i,t-1 consists of variables that correspond to the CAMEL 10 model plus an indicator of bank size. In particular, capital adequacy (C) is represented by the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets of bank i. This indicator, N1, is calculated according to CBR guidelines (the minimum value of N1 should be 10%). Asset quality (A) is expressed as the ratio of reserves to total assets of bank i (RES_AS) following IMF definitions (IMF, 2012) as the level of non-performing loans (NPL) using Russian accounting standards underestimates the actual situation. For our robustness checks (Section 6), nevertheless, we consider 7 Interbank transaction volume indicates how active a bank is in the market, not the value of its interbank borrowing. For example, if a bank borrows and repays one million rubles on five trading days in a row, the transaction volume is 5 million rubles not 1 million. 8 See section 3 for details. 9 The IMF reports Russia recovered from the crisis in 2010, when GDP growth recovered to over 4% a year (IMF, 2011) . 10 CAMEL stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings, and Liquidity.
the models with a proxy for asset quality, namely the ratio of NPL to total loans of bank i. Breusch-Pagan test, and test for differing group intercepts), we select the fixed effects model from our three model options (pooled OLS, fixed effect, and random effect models).
Management quality (M) is characterized by
The participation equation (PE) has as a dependent variable an indicator of bank's involvement in the interbank market (equal to 0 when a bank has no interbank borrowing and zero volume, and 1 when rate or volume of interbank borrowing are positive). Independent variables include the instant liquidity ratio N2, 11 the ratio of total loans over total assets, logarithm of total assets, and interbank borrowings over total assets. All variables 11 N2 measures the risk of losing liquidity during one operational day and is calculated as the ratio of highly liquid assets to liabilities on demand corrected by the minimum balance of demand accounts of individuals and legal entities. It should not be less than 15%. 
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Determining the efficiency of market discipline
Now we turn to the examination of the market discipline efficiency in the interbank market to study how a particular bank's risk levels and regulatory capital are influenced by its interbank borrowing.
We follow the logic of Nier and Baumann (2006) . They consider an econometric model where the dependent variable is represented as the ratio of bank's equity capital to the bank's other liabilities. Independent variables include indicators associated with market discipline: support from the government expressed as the Fitch support rating, amount of uninsured interbank deposits borrowed by the bank, amount of subordinated debt issued by the bank, level of information disclosure by the bank (expressed using variables indicating whether a bank is listed on a US exchange, whether it has a rating and whether it provides information of the core disclosures in its published accounts), bank-level control variables (volatility of bank's weekly equity returns, ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans, bank size, and returns on equity), and country-level control variables.
The idea is to verify the hypothesis that market discipline relates to the bank's incentives to diminish its risk of default. As Nier and Baumann (2006) point out, the risk of default depends on the underlying asset risk and leverage, which, in turn, depends on the bank's capital buffer. Thus, they tested to see whether market discipline results in a higher capital buffer. If this hypothesis is not rejected, then market discipline is considered efficient in motivating banks to choose a lower probability of default.
Following the above-described reasoning, we examine the effect of market discipline on the level of bank capital and the level of bank asset risk (including level of credit risk, liquidity risk and overall risk). The econometric model employed is presented below:
Overall bank risk is approximated by the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA). 13 A bank's capital level is represented by the capital adequacy ratio (N1). To reflect a bank's credit risk, we employ two proxies: non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans and the ratio of reserves to total assets of bank i.
As proxies for liquidity risk, we take two indicators prescribed by CBR guidelines.
14 These include the instant liquidity ratio N2 and the current liquidity ratio N3 described above in section 4.1.
To examine the effect of market discipline on the risk behavior of bank i, we use the following explanatory variables (x it-1 ): the ratio of total interbank borrowing to total assets of bank i, the ratio of interbank foreign borrowing to total assets of bank i, the natural logarithm of the interbank borrowing volume of bank i, and the natural logarithm of the interbank foreign borrowing volume of bank i.
We also employ a set of bank-level control variables (z it-1 ) that might influence risk-taking behavior of a bank to isolate the effects of our market discipline indicators. In particular, we consider the share of interest income to total revenues and the share of total loans to total assets (both indicators reflect the degree to which a bank is engaged in the traditional banking rather than speculative activity, and thus affect bank risk exposure), ROA (a measure of bank earnings that also indicates the effectiveness of bank operations), bank size, 15 and the rate of total asset growth, which could reflect the risk of expanding business too slowly or too quickly and thereby influence the risk characteristics of the bank.
The explanatory variables again are taken with a one-quarter lag. We also include the explanatory and control variables multiplied by the crisis dummy to examine the efficiency of market discipline during periods of distress.
We employ a panel data model for our estimations and use a set of appropriate tests to determine our selection of a pooled OLS, fixed effect, or random effect model.
Empirical Analysis
Data
We use quarterly financial data of Russian banks for the period 1Q2004-2Q2011. The information is taken from the Mobile database "Banks and Finance" Analytical System, which is based, in turn, on individual bank financial statements prepared according to Russian accounting standards and compiled by the CBR. The 665 banks in our sample represented 86% of the total assets in the Russian banking system as of July 1, 2011.
16 Table 1 Descriptive statistics Interbank borrowing volume data are taken directly from the CBR website. The data are available from 1Q2007, so the panel is unbalanced. 
Existence of market discipline
The results of the first step, estimation of the participation equation, are presented in Table   A1 in Appendix II.
We now analyze the existence of quantity-based market discipline. As evident from Table 2 below, there are signs of market discipline for the entire sample during the full period under consideration. All variables representing bank fundamentals are jointly significant at the 1% confidence level.
As predicted, the results vary depending on the measure used for quantitative market discipline. The signs of market discipline for loan growth are scarce and unstable, while those for loan volume are more evident. Market discipline related to bank fundamentals, absent during stable times, emerges during the crisis. Financial instability seems to draw focus to the reserve levels of bank counterparties. This effect is stable when the dependent variable is represented by the interbank borrowing volume. The higher the ratio of a bank's reserves to total assets, the lower its interbank borrowing volume. This relationship is also seen during non-crisis times in some model specifications, but the result is not stable.
Interestingly, the size of the bank has a significant positive impact on the interbank volume during the entire observation period, as well as the rate of interbank loan growth during the crisis. This result confirms the existence of too-big-to fail policies in Russia's case. Larger banks find it easier to obtain funds as it is implicitly assumed that they will be bailed out by the state. Moreover, other bank fundamentals do not behave in line with the market discipline hypothesis.
The share of interbank borrowing to total assets, in line with expectations, has a negative sign in the model with growth of interbank borrowing and a positive sign in the model with the interbank borrowing volume. However, this variable has a negative sign in both models during the crisis.
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It is important to emphasize that foreign lenders (see Table 3 above) mainly pay attention to bank size. No bank fundamentals behave in line with the market discipline hypothesis in models with interbank borrowing from foreign lenders as a dependent variable.
The share of interbank borrowings to total assets again has a negative sign in the model with the rate of interbank borrowing growth and a positive sign in the model with interbank borrowing volume. During the crisis, however, this variable has a negative sign in the latter model.
Efficiency of market discipline
We now turn to the efficiency of market discipline. Our analysis of the influence of interbank borrowing on bank risk-taking behavior suggests that the efficiency of market discipline in Russia is rather low (see Tables 4 and 5 ). The only effect in line with the market discipline efficiency hypothesis is that a higher level of interbank borrowing in one period corresponds to a decline in the level of credit risk, i.e. we see fewer bad loans (model with rate of interbank borrowing growth) and lower reserves (model with interbank borrowing volume) in the following period. However, this tends to even out over time, including during the crisis period. Thus, the relationship of interbank borrowing, capitalization, liquidity risk, and the overall bank risk is ambiguous and does not evidence efficiency of market discipline. Importantly, when as independent variables the interbank foreign borrowings are used (Table 6 and 7 below), the results reveal the inefficiency of market discipline from non-residents. Banks borrowing from foreign counterparties has no impact on the risktaking behavior of banks. 
Robustness checks
Our first robustness check considers models where the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets is used as the proxy for credit risk (Tables A2-A3 in Appendix II). The second robustness check corrects our data for outliers and examines if this changes the findings (Tables A4-A7 in Appendix II).
Our results do not change qualitatively when we use an alternative proxy for credit risk. In particular, all bank fundamentals remain jointly significant at the 1% confidence level. The only stable result is for credit risk during the crisis when the dependent variable is represented by interbank borrowing volume. The higher the NPL ratio to total loans, the lower the interbank borrowing volume. The statistically significant size variable again suggests the existence of too-big-to-fail policies in Russia. The size of a bank has a positive impact on interbank borrowing volume during the full observation period, as well as on the rate of interbank borrowing growth during the crisis. Again, there is no sign of market discipline coming from non-resident lender. Their main lending criterion seems to be bank size. than 500, the share of reserves in total assets is greater than 1, the share of RWA to total assets is greater than 1, and the share of bad loans to total loans is greater than 1. Table 6 below presents the descriptive statistics after correction for outliers. The results of the estimations are presented in Tables A4-A7 in Appendix II.
The findings remain qualitatively similar. There are some indication that market discipline exists during the crisis. The level of reserves and non-performing loans negatively influence interbank borrowing volume during the crisis. The negative effect of nonperforming loans is present during the full period when the dependent variable is the rate of rate of interbank borrowing growth. The signs of other banks fundamentals that appear statistically significant do not evidence the existence of market discipline. Foreign lenders again pay most attention to bank size rather than risk characteristics. However, a higher level of reserves leads to a lower rate of growth in interbank borrowing from foreign lenders, especially during the crisis.
When the data is corrected for outliers without winsorizing, market discipline is found too inefficient to influence the risk-taking behavior of banks.
Conclusions
The interbank market is crucial to a well-functioning financial system. It helps in distributing liquidity among banks and links them to each other. Such linkage, however, creates the possibility of contagion in a crisis that can aggravate financial instability. Thus, regulators need to understand whether the interbank market functions efficiently and when regulatory intervention is appropriate.
This study considers market discipline in the Russian interbank market between 2004 and 2011. We first sought to establish the existence of market discipline using Heckman's sample selection model. We then analyzed the efficiency of market discipline on borrower bank risk-taking behavior using a panel data model. Our findings suggest that quantitative market discipline was present in the market only during the financial crisis, and even then its efficiency in reducing bank risk-taking during that period was rather low.
One explanation could be that government intervention during the crisis inhibited efficient functioning of the interbank market.
Nier and Baumann (2006) note three conditions that should be satisfied for efficient market discipline:
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• bank creditors should be at risk of loss if the bank defaults,
• changes in the bank's risk profile should lead to market responses that are costly for the bank, and
• the market should have access to adequate information concerning the risk profile of the bank.
These conditions are not fully satisfied in the case of Russian banks. For example, it was evident during the recent crisis period that the first condition (creditor exposure to risk in a bank default) was not fully satisfied. The government also intervened to avoid the default of many banks in order to restore the stability of the banking sector and indirectly bailed out bank creditors. Finally, as noted by the IMF, Russia's banking system still has a relatively low level of transparency (IMF, 2011) . This was evident from our analysis.
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